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ABSTRACT 
This paper is devoted to the analysis of the differences in the share of low wage work in six countries. The 
main differences are related with the set of institutions that influence the regulation of labour markets. It is 
emphasized the role of collective bargaining, minimum wages, product market regulations and welfare 
systems.  
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RESUMEN 
Este artículo analiza las razones de las diferencias de la importancia relativa del trabajo de bajo salario entre 
seis países. Se estudia como estas diferencias se deben fundamentalmente a las instituciones que regulan las 
relaciones laborales. Las instituciones que tienen una mayor influencia son la negociación colectiva, el 
salario mínimo, las regulaciones de los mercados de productos  y el sistema de protección social 
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Introduction 
 
This article presents some of the key findings on the impact of pay setting insti-
tutions on the extent of low wage work of studies in the United States and five 
European countries, namely Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and 
United Kingdom, initiated and funded by the Russell Sage Foundation. National 
researchers used available data to draw the broader contours of low-wage work in 
each country. To measure the extent of low-wage work it was defined as earning a 
gross hourly wage of less than two-thirds of each country’s median gross hourly 
wage. The comparison of the national institutional structures in these countries was 
supplemented by case studies on specific jobs in five industries in all countries – 
call centres, food processing, retail outlets, hospitals, and hotels. These case studies 
were exploring the effects of variations in institutional structures on jobs which 
were typically low paid in the United States.  structures on jobs which were typi-
cally low paid in the United. The result of this research was published in six country 
monographs and one comparative volume1. 
In the mid-2000s, according to the coordinated analysis of separate national 
data-sets in each of the six countries, the United States had the highest share of low-
wage employment, with about 25 percent of workers earning less than two-thirds of 
the national median hourly wage. Germany, contrary to widespread expectations, 
was the European country in the mid-2000s with the next-highest share of low-
wage work (22.7 percent), followed closely by the United Kingdom (21.7 percent). 
The Netherlands (17.6 percent) fell about midway between these three low-wage-
intensive economies, on the one hand, and France (11.1 percent) and Denmark (8.5 
percent), on the other hand, both of which had substantially smaller low-wage 
shares2. As important as the incidence of low wage work is the development over 
the last decades. Since the 1970s, the low-wage employment share has been falling 
steadily in France. Over the same period, low-wage shares were relatively constant 
in Denmark (at a low level) and the United States (at a high level, with some cycli-
cal variation). In the remaining three countries, however, low-wage employment 
was much higher in the mid-2000s than it had been at the end of the 1970s. The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom both saw large increases in the low-wage 
share over the 1980s and 1990s, with no further increases in the 2000s. In Germany, 
_____________ 
 
1 The US volume is: Appelbaum/ Bernhardt/ Murnane 2003. The five national European 
volumes are: Bosch/Weinkopf (2008) on Germany; Caroli/ Gautié (2008) on France; Lloyd/ 
Mason/Mayhew (2008) on the United Kingdom; Salverda/ van Klaveren/van der Meer 
(2008) on the Netherlands; and Westergaard-Nielsen (2008) on Denmark. The comparative 
research is published in Gautié/Schmitt 2009. The present paper relies heavily on Bosch, 
Mayhew and Gautié (2009). 
2 Those figures include apprentices in France, the Netehrlands and the United-Kingdom 
(but not in Denmark and Germany).  
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before reunification, the low-wage share was flat or falling, but from the mid-1990s, 
the German low-wage share also increased steadily (Mason/Salverda 2010).   
One of the main challenges of the research presented here is to explain these 
substantial and enduring international differences in the prevalence of low-wage 
work as well as it different development over the last decades.  Such different 
developments cannot be explained with timeless and universal explanations like the 
hypothesis of skill-biased technological developments  for two reasons.  First there 
is no indication that this bias is substantially lower in countries with a lower inci-
dence in low wage work. Secondly low wage work is not necessarily unskilled 
work. In Germany for example about 80% of low wage worker are skilled. Also 
country-specific, long-run, economic structural factors seem to have played little 
role in explaining international differences in low-wage work. National shares of 
low-wage work do not appear to be correlated with a country’s GDP per capita, 
GDP growth rate, hourly labor productivity, productivity growth rate, or a range of 
long-term demographic factors, including female employment rates. Nor do be-
tween-country differences in the labor share of total value-added appear to play a 
decisive role in explaining the incidence of low-wage work. The incidence of low 
pay, however, is strongly related to the distribution of income within the labor share 
of value-added in each country, a phenomenon on which we hope our findings here 
shed some light (Mason and Salverda 2009). 
 The analysis of the overall incidence of low pay in the six countries and the re-
sults of the case studies in five industries suggest that “pay-setting institutions” play 
a central role in explaining international differences in low-wage work. By pay-
setting institutions, we mean the formal and sometimes informal mechanisms used 
to determine the wages (and benefits) received by workers in different industries 
and occupations within each country. More specifically, we mean collective-
bargaining arrangements, minimum wages, and other labor and product market 
regulations that have an impact on wage determination.    
These institutions with their mutual linkages may form inclusive or exclusive 
pay setting systems. In exclusive systems, the pay and other terms and conditions of 
employees with strong bargaining power have little or no effect on employees with 
weaker bargaining power within a company, within an industry or across industries. 
Inclusive systems extend the benefits of such bargaining power to workers who 
have relatively little bargaining power in their own right. The more inclusive the set 
of institutions, the better protected are those at the low end of the workforce. Inclu-
siveness does not depend just on the formal institutions but also on the extent to 
which the various players are committed to reducing inequality.  
 This article looks, in turn, at the "inclusiveness" of collective bargaining ar-
rangements (section 2) and national minimum wages (section 3),  product-market 
deregulations as opportunities for "exit options" from the generally more inclusive 
national pay-setting systems (section 4); at issues related to pay setting at the firm 
level through “social wages”  (section 5) and finally at the trade-off between wage 
equality and employment (section 6). 
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2. The impact of collective bargaining on pay  
 
The well known, close relationship between the incidence of low pay and coverage3 
by collective agreements (OECD 1997 Chapter 3) can be observed in the six 
countries covered in this study (see Figure 1). Not only do the three countries with 
the lowest incidences of low pay (Denmark, France and the Netherlands) have 
greater coverage than the countries (USA, UK and Germany) with higher incidence, 
coverage in the former group has increased or remained stable since 1980, whilst it 
has decreased in the latter (see Table 1). Historically, the UK and Germany had 
high levels of coverage (in the UK until the early 1980s and in Germany until the 
mid 1990s) which, after substantial transformations of institutions and of employer 
and state strategies, subsequently declined.  
 
Figure 1: Incidence of low pay and coverage by collective agreements 2005 
 
 
 
Source: Low pay incidence: Mason/Salverda 2009. Coverage: Visser 2008: 27 
_____________ 
 
3 The coverage rate refers to the share of workers who benefit from a collective agreement. 
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Table 1. Collective Bargaining Coverage* 1980, 1990, 2007 
 1980 1990 2007 Change  1980 - 2007 
USA 26 18 14 - 12 
UK 70 54 35 - 35 
DE 78 72 63 - 15 
FR 85 92 95 +  10 
NL 76* 82 82 +  6 
DK 69* 69* 82 + 13 
Source: with * from OECD 1997: 71, other data from Visser 2008 
* Figures in this table are from the most reliable comparative data source available. National 
statistical sources may produce slightly different numbers. In France, the figure is only for 
workers covered by a branch collective agreement. If workers covered by a firm collective 
agreement, or benefiting from special status (mainly in public owned firms in utilities and 
transportation) are added, the coverage rate amounts to almost 98% in 2004. 
 
 
The extent of collective bargaining coverage (see Tables 2 and 3) depends on 
different institutional settings in different countries. We can distinguish four types 
of institutional linkages:  
 
(1) Low inclusiveness because of low trade union density.  In the two liberal 
market economies (the US and the UK) coverage is mainly influenced by 
trade union density. Employers associations at the industry and higher 
levels are weak and are mainly lobbying organizations rather than actors in 
the collective bargaining process. Shrinking trade union density, in the 
absence of other mechanisms to cover non-unionized workers (such as 
strong employer organizations or extension of agreements by the state) has 
led to a decline in coverage in these two countries. Although in these two 
countries unions fail to extend the benefits of collective bargaining to non-
union workers, unions do succeed in improving the wages and work 
conditions of their members (Schmitt et al 2007) 
(2) High inclusiveness because of high trade union density.  As in the US and 
UK, in Denmark union coverage is mainly determined by trade union 
density, but density is high across the whole economy. More than 70% of 
the workforce is union members and density has remained fairly stable over 
recent decades. Because of strong union power, most firms who are not 
party to an agreement also pay the negotiated rates. As a result, collective 
bargaining coverage is even higher than union density. However, the state 
is not completely absent. High density in Denmark can partly be explained 
by the so-called Ghent-system in which the unions run unemployment 
insurance funds, financed mainly by the state. This, together with the fact 
that job protection is low (see below), creates strong incentives to join a 
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union and to stay in it when you leave your job. Only workers with high 
individual bargaining power or young workers who are still in education 
and are not yet looking for permanent employment do not join a union.  
(3) High inclusiveness because of extended collective agreements and strong 
employer organizations.  In France and the Netherlands trade union density 
has been falling but without the same negative impact on coverage as in the 
UK and USA. In fact, collective bargaining coverage has actually increased 
even as density has fallen, due primarily to increased employer organization 
and strong support by the state. In France, as in the Netherlands, non-
discriminatory agreements are legally required, so that negotiated 
agreements are extended to both unionized and non-union-workers in any 
given company. In addition, the state declares most agreements to be 
generally binding throughout the relevant sector, giving collective 
agreements significant leverage 4 . In a small country, such as the 
Netherlands, coordination between employers is easier than in bigger 
countries, whilst central agreements on wage moderation, which are 
attractive for employers, can only be implemented with high employer 
coverage or legal extension mechanisms.  
(4) Low inclusiveness in spite of high employer density5 and high coverage.  As 
in France and the Netherlands, high employer density is the major 
institution for achieving medium to high coverage in Germany. However, 
in contrast to France and the Netherlands, employer density is shrinking. 
Collective bargaining is still important but the linkages between the well 
organized industries and regions and the less organized industries and 
regions have been broken. In contrast to past practice, employers’ 
organizations are now generally refusing to agree to the extension of 
agreements. As a result, there is no mechanism to extend coverage to 
industries with weak unions. Collective agreements on minimum pay levels 
are declared generally binding in only a few industries (see below), so that 
decreasing employer density has directly reduced bargaining coverage.   
 
These four types of collective bargaining circumstances differ not only in their 
institutional linkages, but also with respect to their institutional stability.  
_____________ 
 
4 Furthermore, in France, in spite of very low density, unions have considerable bargain-
ing power since they are, at least in the public services, able to mobilize workers for indus-
trial action. 
5 Employer density can be defined as the share of employers who are members of an 
employers’ organization.  
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Figure 2. Excluded employees in Germany 
 Within an establishment Within an industry Across industries 
Excluded 
Employees 
Agency workers 
Posted workers 
Mini-jobbers 
Outsourced jobs 
Many employees in 
SMEs which left  the 
employers’ 
association 
Disappearance of 
pattern agreements 
Low coverage in new 
service industries   
 
Table 2. Collective bargaining coverage, employers’ organizations and union den-
sity 2007 
 
 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90 91-100 
France U       E  Cov 
Netherlands   U     E Cov  
Denmark      E  U Cov  
Germany   U    
E  
Cov 
   
UK   U Cov, E       
USA E 
U, 
Cov 
        
Cov = Bargaining coverage (non-standardised).  
E = Employers’ density: share in % of employers member of an Employer organization 
(private sector).  
U = Union density: share in % of employees who are union members.  
*2000 
Source: Visser 2008, European Commission  2006 
 
Table 3. Union # and employers density* and extension of agreements  
 
Trade 
Union 
density 
1980 
Trade 
Union 
density 
1990 
Trade 
Union 
density 
2007 
Change  
1980 – 
2007 
Em-
ployer 
density 
1994- 
1996* 
Em-
ployer 
density 
2000 
Change 
1994/6 
– 2000 
Exten-
sion of 
agree-
ments 
by the 
state 
USA 22 16 12 - 10 0 0 - No 
UK 51 39 29 - 22 54 40 - 14 No 
DE 35 31 20 - 15 72 63 -  9 Few and 
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decreas-
ing 
FR 18 10 8 - 10 74 74 - 
Very 
high 
and 
stable 
NL 35 26 26 - 9 79 85 + 6 
Very 
high 
and 
stable 
DK 76 71 68 - 7 39 52 + 13 No 
 
# Net union density (Trade union membership minus inactive members (retired, students 
etc.)  
*Measured by employees covered by employer peak organizations 
 Source: trade union density: OECD 1997:71 and Visser 2008; employer density:  
 data for 1996/7, Traxler 2004; for 2000, European Commission 2004 
 
 
A precondition for high coverage as well as for inclusiveness within industries 
seems to be multi-employer bargaining at the industry or sectoral level. This gives 
employers organizations an active role in collective bargaining, which they do not 
have if decentralized bargaining is dominant, as it is in the UK or the US. Multi-
employer bargaining makes co-ordination of collective agreements between differ-
ent industries easier. It also gives collective bargaining more stability because, to an 
extent, it takes wages out of competition within any given industry. It encourages 
the social partners to include new types of workers, new companies and new indus-
tries in collective bargaining and to avoid fragmentation of bargaining if product 
markets are deregulated (see below). In addition, it aggregates the interests of 
employees and employers, which can give the social partners a better opportunity to 
negotiate other issues than only wages at the industry or national level and gives 
them a strong voice in negotiations with the government.  An example of this is the 
strong involvement of the social partners in vocational training in Germany and 
Denmark (Bosch and Charest 2010). 
The country monographs clearly show that the scope of multi-employer bargain-
ing and its coordination is absolutely central to explaining the differences between 
the countries. In Denmark, the country with the lowest share of low-wage workers, 
unions pursued a solidaristic wage policy as in other Scandinavian countries. The 
Danes have successfully reduced wage differentials between industries and between 
different groups of workers (by gender, skill and region) within industries, which 
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was possible only because of the strength of the national umbrella union federation6.  
Furthermore in 2005 the social partners also agreed to introduce a high minimum 
wage for all industries – see below.7 This policy can be explained in part by the 
high trade union density. Unions have high shares of members from low wage 
industries and push for more wage equality (EC 2008: 86).   
Such strong intervention in the overall earnings distribution is not a feature in 
the other countries with multi-employer negotiations where unions are dominated 
by workers with strong bargaining power. In France, the Netherlands and Germany, 
pay differentials between industries have remained high. In these three countries, 
unions have not pursued, or did not have the power to pursue, a solidaristic wage 
policy. In all three countries, unions in the typical labor intensive low wage indus-
tries have been too weak to negotiate wages much above a low floor. In many 
French industries the national minimum wage is higher than the collectively agreed 
rate. In Germany, the collectively agreed rates in a number of industries are below 
the low wage threshold.  Multi-employer bargaining, however, has helped to reduce 
wage differences within industries and between regions. But, in recent years, the 
metal industries agreement no longer serves as the pattern agreement for the whole 
economy, diminishing the impact of bargaining on wage differentials.8  
In the decentralized bargaining systems of the UK and the US there are virtually 
no higher level or pattern agreements left. Until the 1980s significant parts of the 
UK economy, including much of private manufacturing and even some private 
services, had multi-employer agreements.  These agreements set minimum terms 
and conditions for the sector or industry concerned. Though they were not legally 
binding, in effect they did set floors.  During the course of the 1980s such agree-
ments disappeared and bargaining is now confined to the company or even estab-
_____________ 
 
6 As a consequence, unions in the highly productive industries, such as manufacturing, 
have not pressed for wage increases fully corresponding to the growth of their productivity. 
Instead, the gains from productivity growth were relatively equally distributed across the 
economy.  Therefore, in Denmark workers receive decent pay in industries that are typically 
low wage in most other countries. 
7 Overall collective bargaining in Denmark is a powerful instrument for preventative in-
tervention in the national earnings distribution, which eases the redistributive burden im-
posed on the welfare state. This preventative intervention also supports the citizen status 
even of low-wage earners. They are tax payers, whilst all workers and not just the low wage 
ones are recipients of universal welfare transfers like child allowances. 
8 In Germany and the Netherlands, the major coordination mechanism between indus-
tries (and regions in Germany) was provided by pattern agreements. The pace was set 
mainly by the metal industries agreement and most other industries followed. The amount of 
low wage work in Germany increased when the metal industries agreement became signifi-
cantly less important in setting such a pattern because more and more employers’ organiza-
tions refused to follow it and an increasing proportion of employees were not covered by an 
agreement at all. 
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lishment level.  Thus, a dramatic fall in union density was accompanied by a major 
change in the industrial relations architecture.  Today, therefore, coverage in the 
United Kingdom is only slightly higher than union density.  The same is true in the 
United States, where the steady drop in union density since the mid-1970s is en-
tirely a function of the decline in private-sector union membership.  Collective 
bargaining takes place mainly at the company level and only employees at the 
relevant company are covered. Coverage is not extended by the state or by member-
ship of an employers’ organization.  Thus, falling trade union membership not only 
reduced coverage but also the indirect spill-over influence of collective bargaining 
on the economy as a whole9. Fewer and fewer companies are afraid of union or-
ganization campaigns and are therefore more willing than they used to be to pay 
lower rates. 
Germany was regarded for many years as a flagship of coordinated market 
economies with low earnings dispersion. It still has much higher coverage by col-
lective agreements than the USA and UK but nearly as many low wage earners. 
This specific combination of high coverage and low inclusion needs some explana-
tion. The options for companies to avoid coverage by collective agreements have 
been substantially increased by the use of new partially or unregulated forms of 
work (mini-jobs, agency work, posted workers) or by outsourcing them to non-
covered SMEs in the same or other industries. Most restrictions on the use of 
agency work were abolished by the Hartz laws in 2004. After this deregulation in 
2004 the amount of temporary agency work grew dramatically - from about 
300,000 in 2003 to 850, 000 in June 2008. The law, however, still requires equal 
pay for agency workers, but firms can sidestep this requirement through the use of 
collective agreements. Employers have exploited this loophole by reaching agree-
ments with the “Christian Trade Unions”, which generally do not have members in 
the affected firms and are supporting employers, fixing wage rates at between €5 
and €7.  Another striking illustration of the “protection gap” is provided by the case 
of “mini-jobs” positions where the top earnings are limited to €400 per month. 
"Mini-jobbers" do not pay social contributions or income tax, and are not covered 
by social insurance; instead employers pay a flat rate tax. Mini-jobbers are legally 
(or via collective agreements) entitled to equal treatment in terms of hourly wages, 
working-time, holidays, sick pay and other employment rights (and notably protec-
tion against dismissal), but in practice these requirements are generally not met.  
The number of mini-jobbers has increased dramatically in recent years and, by the 
_____________ 
 
9 Until the 1980s many US manufacturing companies followed the agreements of the Big 
Three in the car industry.  Today there is no pattern agreement left even within the car 
industry - the Big Three have become relatively smaller and are under extremely high 
competitive pressures from other companies that are not covered by an agreement (Levy and 
Temin 2007). 
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mid-2000s, mini-jobs comprised about 15% of total employment and an even larger 
proportion in some low wage sectors (25% in retail, 36% in hotels and restaurants). 
 
 
3. Regulating Low Wages: The Role of Minimum Wages 
 
3.1. Different institutional arrangements and different policies  
The minimum wage takes different forms in the six countries studied10 . In 
France and the Netherlands, collective agreements fix minimum wage levels at the 
industry level, which are then usually extended by the government to uncovered 
workers throughout the industry. These agreements not only set a minimum pay 
floor but also establish a complete pay scale with different rates for different types 
of jobs and employee characteristics (mainly skills and seniority) and, in many 
cases, additional industry specific premiums and bonuses as well as some fringe 
benefits. In Germany, in a small number of industries such as construction, cleaning 
and postal services, the government declares the minimum wage set in the industry 
collective agreement as binding within the industry but generally does not extend 
other terms of the agreement.11 In Denmark, the social partners agree on a national 
minimum wage floor, which is enforced by unions and employers. Finally, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, France, and the Netherlands have a legislated 
national minimum wage rates (NMW in the following), often called “statutory” or 
“legal” minimum wages.12  In France and the Netherlands, if the minimum pay rate 
set by the industry collective agreement is lower than the NMW, the latter must 
apply.13   
Three characteristics of a NMW play key roles in shaping the wage distribution: 
its coverage, its level, and its implementation.  One may define the legal (or “for-
mal”) “inclusiveness” of a NMW by the extent of its legal coverage. This coverage 
does not differ much across the four countries in this study with a NMW (see Table 
4), since almost all industries and firms are covered. But there are also some special 
rates for young workers that constitute legal “exit options” (i.e. legal ways to avoid 
and/or circumvent stricter regulations). In the Netherlands, these youth rates are 
very low and, in that sense, the NMW in that country is less “inclusive” than it is in  
_____________ 
 
10At the time of writing, Germany is having a serious debate about the introduction of a 
national minimum wage (Bosch and Kalina, 2010). 
11These agreements may set different rates for different groups of workers, for example, 
in construction, for unskilled and skilled workers. 
12In recent years, the United States has also seen a rise in state-level minimum wages at 
levels that are higher than the federal minimum wage, but still low relative to the minimum 
wage rates in the other five countries.  
13 In France in 2005, in more than 50% of the industry collective agreements, the mini-
mum pay rate was below the NMW and therefore not implemented (see Gautié, 2010). 
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France, the UK and the US. However, the gap between formal regulations and 
reality may be important.  The industry case studies carried out in the comparative 
research (see Gautié and Scmitt, 2009) shed some light on the “effective” (as op-
posed to “formal”) inclusiveness of the NMW.  Among the occupations covered, 
housekeepers in hotels provide the most striking example (see Vanselow and alii., 
2009). Practices that are more or less illegal are common in all five European 
countries: undeclared work and target quotas of rooms per day to be cleaned that 
are not feasible in normal hours (i.e. when the monthly wage is divided by the 
actual number of hours worked, the real hourly rate can be significantly  below the 
legal NMW).  Unpaid overtime (which is the most common way of circumventing 
the legal hourly minimum wage) is also a feature in other sectors in some countries 
(such as retail in France).  Overall, there may be a non negligible number of work-
ers earning less than the NMW, especially in countries where its level is high or 
enforcement is low. 
In the mid 2000s, the level of the NMW differed substantially, both in absolute 
and relative terms, between France, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. At the 
beginning of 2007 the monthly purchasing power14 of an American full time (adult) 
minimum wage earner was notably lower than the purchasing power of his or her 
European counterpart (about 32% lower than in France, 37% lower than in the 
Netherlands, and about 40% lower than in the UK – see Regnard, 2007). In 2006, 
the gross wage of a full time minimum wage earner was just under half of that of 
the average wage of a full time worker in France and the Netherlands (47% and 
46% respectively15), and only about one third in the UK and the US (35% and 34% 
respectively) – Immervoll (2007). These contrasts are the consequence of very 
different policies during the past 15 years or more. The NMW was frozen in nomi-
nal terms in the United States between 1996 and 2007 and increased only a small 
amount in the Netherlands during the same period. As a consequence, the value of 
the NMW decreased in the two countries both in real and relative terms.16 By con-
trast, the increase in the NMW has been substantial in France and the UK (since its 
introduction in 1999). In France, the NMW (the so-called “SMIC”) is legally in-
dexed to consumer prices and (partially) to the growth of the hourly wages of blue-
collar workers. Thus, even without any specific government intervention, the pur-
_____________ 
 
14 Based on the monthly value of NMWs converted into dollars at the purchasing power 
parity rate. Table 7 provides an estimate of the purchasing power of the hourly net NMW. 
15 In the Netherlands, 46% refers to employees who were 23 years old or more, working 
full time.  
16 Another consequence of the long-term stagnation of the real value of the federal 
minimum wage has been the rise of state-level minimum wages (see Dube, Leister and 
Reich, 2007) and more locally oriented "living-wage campaigns" (see Pollin and Luce, 
1998). 
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chasing power of minimum wage earners is preserved and even increases through 
time17.  
The level of the NMW in relative terms (i.e. expressed as a percentage of the av-
erage or median wage) determines how hard it “bites”. The share of employees 
receiving the minimum wage is highest in France (see Table 4)18. NMW policies 
may have a direct impact on the global incidence of low wage work by reducing 
wage inequality, at least at the bottom of the wage distribution. There is indeed 
strong evidence that the introduction of a NMW (as in the UK) or the increases in 
its relative level (as in both the UK and France) reduce wage dispersion below the 
median and below the low wage threshold19. Even if the NMW has remained well 
below the low wage threshold in the United Kingdom, it may nevertheless have 
contributed to the stabilization of the share of low wage work witnessed since the 
end of the nineties20.. The story is different for France, where the low wage thresh-
old was only about 5% higher than the SMIC in the early 2000s, and where the 
share of low wage work has been declining in the past ten years. In sharp contrast, 
the small increments in the nominal value of the minimum wage in the Netherlands 
played an important role in the rise in low wage work there in the 1990s. In the 
United States, the real and relative decline of the minimum wage may have been a 
key factor in the increase of inequalities in the bottom half of the wage distribution 
in the US in the 1980s and 1990s (Di Nardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1997; Manning, 
2003, chap.12). Meanwhile, the absence of a NMW in Germany and the high dif-
ferentiation of the NMW by age in the Netherlands explain the long tail in the 
income distribution down to very low rates of pay which are effectively cut-off by 
the minimum wages in UK and France. Note that collective bargaining and statu-
_____________ 
 
17 Moreover, over the last 30 years – and notably since the end of the 1990s - French 
governments have increased the SMIC beyond these legal requirements. The hourly “SMIC’ 
increased by 33.4% between 1999 and 2006 (19% in real terms). This resulted partly from 
the implementation of the law on the reduction of weekly working time (the so-called “35 
hours law”) when the government chose to maintain the monthly earnings of minimum 
wage earners. In the UK the NMW rose by 48.6% during the same period. 
18 The figure for France is not directly comparable with the figures for other countries. It 
covers all those workers whose basic wage (i.e. without taking into account any bonus or 
premia, such as those for seniority) is the SMIC. But the total hourly compensation of many 
“SMIC” earners is much higher than the hourly SMIC: in 2006, for instance, 18% of SMIC 
earners had an effective total hourly compensation 30% higher than the SMIC – see Gautié 
(2010).  
19 In the United-Kingdom, the NMW has cut the gap between the 50th and the 10th per-
centile of the wage distribution by 5 percentage points (Metcalf, 2007). In the English care 
home workers sector the introduction of the NMW caused significant compression at the 
lower end of the wage distribution (Machin, Manning and Rahman, 2003). 
20 This may be due to the « spill over effects” of the NMW increases: wages above the 
NMW can be impacted by its increases, for both economic and social reasons. 
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tory minimum wage can interact. Within Europe as a whole, there is evidence to 
suggest that strong collective bargaining institutions tend to push up the level of the 
statutory minimum wage when there is one (EC, 2008). 
 
3.2. The impact of minimum wages on low wage workers 
There is an extensive literature on the effect of a NMW on employment (see 
Card and Krueger, 1995; Manning, 2003; Ragacs, 2004; Neumark and Wascher, 
2006; Metcalf, 2007, for the UK case). One of the lessons of the “new minimum 
wage research” is that there is no simple relationship between minimum wages and 
employment. Theoretically, the relationship is indeterminate. Minimum wages may 
increase efficiency by reducing turnover or improving motivation. They may also 
increase incentives to work. Where there are monopsonistic labour markets, wages 
will be below the competitive equilibrium.  In these circumstances, a minimum 
wage will compensate for the low bargaining power of labour and, by setting a 
higher wage, may even increase employment (Stigler, 1946). For a long time 
monopsony was seen as an exceptional situation.  Manning (2003) argues, however, 
that “one should not get hung up on the prefix ’mono’: no employer exists in 
isolation … and one should think of a model of oligopsony or ‘monopsonistic 
competition’” (p.360). He goes on “There are many frictions in the labour market 
which give employers the power to set wages like mobility costs or lacks of 
transparency about labour market opportunities. If the market power of employers 
is strong then this explains the amazing wage differentials between workers doing 
equal work like the wage gaps between men and women, small and bigger firms, 
good or bad employers”21.  
Overall, there seems to be a “range of indeterminacy” (Lester 1964) in which 
minimum wages can be set without negative employment impacts. Reviews of the 
empirical research have come to the conclusion that the effect on the employment 
of adults has been in general negligible in countries where the NMW rate is rather 
low in relative terms (as in the US or the UK). In the case of young people, there 
have been negative impacts in some cases (OECD 1998: 47, see also Neumark and 
Washer, 2006). But the negative impact on employment may be more sizeable in 
countries, like France, where the level of the NMW is high compared to the median 
wage – see Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis and Philippon (2001) for comparative 
evidence on France and the USA. 
_____________ 
 
21 The idea that monopsony power of employers maybe widespread in advanced econo-
mies is also put forward by Erickson and Mitchell (2007). They see “monopsony as a 
metaphor for the emerging post-union labour market. They argue employee voice needs to 
be restored to counter the undesirable consequences, such as wage inequality and reduced 
worker rights, associated with strong macroeconomic performance. Concerning the gender 
dimension, Bernstein, Hartmann and Schmitt (1999) emphasize how much, in the US, the 
national minimum wage is a “working woman’s issue”. 
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Potential negative employment impacts of minimum wages might be muted by 
subsidizing wages - notably through social contributions exemptions, as in France, 
(Caroli and Gautié, 2008; Gautié 2010) or in Germany with the mini-jobs, which 
are exempt from social security contribution and income tax (see Bosch and Kalina, 
2008a: 48 and 52).   
Another possible way of muting the employment effects of rising minimum 
wages  are policies designed to improve productivity – policies such as investment 
in education and training, active labour market measures, support of life-long 
learning, incentives for innovation and the like.  
Denmark, with its high collectively agreed national minimum wage of €12 per 
hour, is a good example of such a proactive “empowerment” strategy. Extensive 
training in Denmark helps to raise productivity levels of less-skilled workers to the 
level required by the minimum wage.22 Less-skilled workers in Denmark (those 
with only a lower secondary education) receive more job related training hours than 
is the case in any of the other five countries in our study (OECD 200a: Table C5 
1a)23. The highly skilled in Denmark also receive more training than elsewhere, but 
the gap between the skill levels is still lower in Denmark than in our other 
countries. Such institutional complementarities may help to explain why the 
“penniless/jobless” trade-off – depicted by Krugman (1994) - does not necessarily 
hold in a cross-country comparison. In the mid-2000s the wage distribution was 
much more compressed in Denmark than it was in the US, but the employment rate 
(including the employment rate for less-educated workers) was nevertheless higher 
in Denmark than it was in the United States. In the case of the UK, the evidence 
concerning the impact of the introduction of the NMW on firm-provided training is 
more mixed: training decreased in some firms (with a potential negative impact on 
future wages), while others appeared to react by investing more in their employees. 
Aside from the potential negative impact on employment and hours worked, a 
high minimum wage may involve other costs for LW workers – mainly in terms of 
work intensification, reduced fringe benefits or “deferred compensation."  Research 
done for the UK Low Pay Commission indicates that some minimum wage recipi-
ents have had to work harder to “justify” their higher wages, whilst, in some cases, 
other monetary rewards, like bonuses, have been reduced (Denvir and Lucas, 2006).  
A small proportion of affected firms also reduced overtime rates (Low Pay Com-
mission, 2007). In addition some employers reduced fringe benefits in order to 
compensate for the introduction of NMW and subsequent increases. In France, the 
_____________ 
 
22 To get a more complete picture one has to take into account initial education and train-
ing. Germany, for example, has much higher levels of initial vocational training than all the 
other countries which partially compensate for this by investing in further training (Bosch 
and Charest 2010).  
23 In Denmark training and education of adults is mostly financed by enterprises, or the 
state (Lassen et al 2006) 
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high level of the SMIC may have contributed to flatter wage profiles, and therefore 
to a low wage trap24.   
Nevertheless, from a dynamic perspective a NMW can prevent a “race to the 
bottom” that might be encouraged by a variety of economic circumstances or insti-
tutional changes. The recent experience of Germany, which despite recent debate 
(Bosch and Kalina 2008b), still has no NMW, provides a dramatic example here. In 
some sectors, such as meat processing (see Grunert et al., 2009)), a growing number 
of employers have withdrawn from sectoral collective agreements and have taken 
advantage of the very high unemployment levels (partly caused by the low growth 
following the reunification), as well as (more recently), of the entry of Central and 
East European countries into the EU, to set very low wages (4 euros per hour or 
even less). As a consequence, local workers are in danger of being undercut by 
"posted" workers (foreign workers who technically work under the labor law of 
their country of origin, not of the country where they are actually working) with 
very low reservation wages (see Grunert et alii., 2009, and Bosch and Weinkopf, 
2008). In hotels (Vanselow et al., 2009), in hospitals – for cleaning activities - 
(Méhaut et alii., 2009), as well as in call centers (Lloyd et alii., 2009), the use of 
outsourcing to subcontractors is particularly intensive in Germany as compared to 
the other countries, since the arrangement allows employers to escape the collective 
bargaining institutions.  In one of the case study call center, entry wages were set at 
6 euros per hour for qualified workers. Such practices help to explain the significant 
increase in the number of low wage workers in Germany. Overall, a NMW can 
appear as an effective counterbalancing factor to the consequences of the decrease 
in the inclusiveness of collective bargaining.  
 
 
4. Product market regulation and pay setting 
 
Labor standards often depend not only on employment regulations, but also on 
the structure of product markets and their regulation. Often public enterprises were 
monopolies and price-setters, which allowed them to pay high wages and provide 
good working conditions. In addition, tariffs, conduct regulations, including 
restriction on prices and requirements to respect agreed wages (such as prevailing 
wage laws) and market entry regulations often created a supportive environment for 
collective bargaining and labor market regulation.  
Over the last two decades, many product market regulations have been 
weakened or abolished. This deregulation has sometimes been determined at the 
national level and sometimes at the supranational level by international agreements, 
_____________ 
 
24 There is also some evidence that the significant decrease in wage mobility at the bot-
tom of the wage distribution during the seventies was correlated with the large increase of 
the SMIC during this period (Gautié, 2010). 
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such as those concluded in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Indeed, it is not 
too fanciful to describe product market deregulation as organized globalization via 
(self)-transformation of the national states. Deregulation of product markets has 
been a major preoccupation of the EU, with the aim of creating a single, 
competitive European market.  The EU member states agreed to deregulate 
important industries like gas, electricity, water, communications (post and 
telephone) and transport.  In most countries public enterprises had dominated these 
industries. Because of EU directives, the member states were obliged to open entry 
to new competitors. In most cases EU member-states also privatized public firms or 
are planning to do it. In theory the European market for the provision of services 
has been open for a long time. However, the possibilities were only rarely exploited 
before the early 1990s. Since then, and particularly since the 2004 entry of new 
Central and East European member states, competition has become more and more 
common. The most recent initiative is the so called Services Directive. Since many 
service markets are highly regulated by licensing and other standards, the European 
Commission proposed in its first drafts of this directive to apply the principle of 
origin to all services with some exceptions (lawyers, of course, who drafted the 
directive, but also the health sector).  
There are tensions between product market deregulation and labour standards. In 
some cases, re-regulation has taken place or provisions to support labor standards 
have been agreed: 
 Posted Workers Directive: Since services could be offered in other 
countries with the working conditions of the home country, this 
made it possible for foreign competitors to undercut terms and 
conditions.  The Posted Workers Directive of 1996, however, 
allowed national governments to set minimum standards or to 
extend collective agreements such that national and foreign 
competitors offer the same pay and benefits.  
 Services Directive: Because of substantial opposition in many EU 
countries, the principle of country of origin for labor standards has 
been removed from the Directive on Internal Services of 2006, 
which means that is now left to the states to require that local rates 
are applied. 
 Privatization: In some countries regulatory authorities have been 
established with some power to enforce labor standards. In the 
German postal industry, new competitors have to be licensed and 
the regulatory authority can require that they pay prevailing 
wages.25  
_____________ 
 
25 This, however, has not been enforced. Therefore a minimum wage was agreed upon in 
2007. This industry specific minimum wage has been extended by a decree of the Labour 
Ministry.  
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The OECD has developed a wide range of indicators monitoring changes in 
product market regulations26. The results show that, over recent years, product 
markets have been deregulated substantially in the six countries in our study (see 
Table 5; Conway and Nicoletti 2006: 42). In 2003, the United Kingdom had the 
least regulated product markets, followed by the US and Denmark, Germany and 
Netherlands, with France some distance behind (Conway and Nicoletti 2006: 47).27 
 
Table 5. Overall indicator of product market regulation, 1998 and 2003 for six 
countries (6=high, 0= low) 
 1998 2003 
USA 1.3 1.0 
UK 1.1 0.9 
DK 1.5 1.0 
DE 1.9 1.4 
NL 1.8 1.4 
FR 2.5 1.7 
Source: Conway, Janod and Nicoletti, 2005: 59 
 
The key question is how these changes in product market regulation affected 
labor standards (Table 6). In short, the impact varied across the countries and has 
been filtered by the national institutions regulating the labor market.  In the United-
States, the United-Kingdom, and Germany product market deregulation has been a 
major factor bringing wages back into competition and in increasing the incidence 
of low pay. In the case of the United-Kingdom, such forces were aided and abetted 
by industrial relations legislation (which made it more difficult for unions to 
organize and for them to pursue industrial action) and by widespread privatization 
in the 1980s and early 1990s.  In the US, deregulation of the trucking industry was a 
major reason for the break up of employers organizations and the collapse of one of 
the few multi-employer agreements - the “National Master Freight Agreement” - 
and substantial wage cuts in this industry (Belzer, 2000: 110). The abolition of 
_____________ 
 
26 The summary indicator (“economy wide product market indicator”) is based on seven-
teen indicators summarizing information on 156 economy-wide or industry-specific regula-
tory provisions. These detailed indicators cover three broad regulatory domains:  state 
control over business enterprises; barriers to entrepreneurship; barriers to international trade 
and investment (Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud, 1999). 
27 The United States had already started deregulation in energy, transport and communi-
cation between 1975 and 1985. The United-Kingdom followed suit between 1985 and 1995. 
Denmark and Germany deregulated these markets primarily between 1995 and 2003. France 
started deregulation between 1995 and 2003, but has still not fully implemented the EU 
directives (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). 
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prevailing wage laws in the construction industry in many US states had a similar 
effect on multi-employer bargaining and pay levels (Philips, 2003).28 In Denmark, 
the Netherlands, and France, deregulation of product markets has had less impact 
on wages and benefits since deregulation did not allow downward pressure on 
employment practices in affected firms and industries. 
 
Table 6. Product market deregulation and labour standards 
 
1.USA Fragmentation or disappearance of collective bargaining in 
deregulated industries. Lower threshold (minimum wage). 
2. UK Disappearance of industry wide bargaining in affected industries. 
Fragmentation or disappearance of collective bargaining in 
deregulated industries.  Since 1999 lower threshold (legal 
minimum wage). 
3. Germany  Threat to, fragmentation of or disappearance of industry-wide 
bargaining. No lower threshold. High percentages of low wages 
in newly privatized industries (postal services etc). 
4. France Low impact because of extension of industry-wide collective 
agreements and legal minimum wage.  
5. Denmark Low impact because of high trade union density and high 
coverage by collective agreements, and the national minimum 
wage set by social partners. 
6. 
Netherlands 
Low impact because of extension of industry-wide collective 
agreements and legal minimum wage. 
 
 
More or less the same principles apply to the opening up of European markets 
for services from other countries. Posted-workers are officially employed by a 
foreign firm which delivers a service to a domestic client firm. The pressure on 
domestic wages depends heavily on the labor market regulations in the client firm’s 
country (Table 7). The downward pressure is greater in countries such as Germany, 
where there is neither statutory national minimum wage nor legal extensions of 
collective agreements.  Posted-workers can be found in the German meat process-
ing industry, for instance, where they can be paid as low as 3 to 5 euros an hour (see 
Grunert et alii., 2009)). 
_____________ 
 
28For a fuller discussion of the connection between product market deregulation and the 
labor market in the United States, see also Peoples (1998). 
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Table 7. Freedom to provide services and its potential impact on labour 
standards in the EU 
1. USA Does not apply. 
2. UK Minimum wage has to be paid to posted-workers.  
3. Germany  Legally binding minimum wages were introduced following the 
posted workers directive only in a few industries (construction, 
cleaning, postal services).  In some other industries since 2004, 
with the entry of the new EU member states, substantial 
undercutting of local rates – especially in the food industry. 
Germany a major target country for foreign providers since it 
does not have a statutory legal minimum wage 
4. France Social dumping based on posted-workers is limited by the legal 
extension of industry-wide collective agreements and statutory 
national minimum wage. Probably some problems with 
enforcement in some industries.  
5. Denmark Social dumping based on posted-workers has been limited so far 
due to high trade union density and high coverage by collective 
agreements. 
6. 
Netherlands 
Social dumping based on posted-workers is limited by the legal 
extension of industry-wide collective agreements and statutory 
national minimum wage. 
 
 
5. The “Social Wage” 
  
Pay setting in the firm is partly influenced by outside institutions the firm includ-
ing industry-wide collective bargaining and minimum wages. Firms themselves are 
also institutions and differ as much as the external institutions influencing pay and 
working conditions. To varying degrees governments oblige firms to pay, in addi-
tion to hourly gross wages, “social wages” (health insurance, paid leave and pen-
sions, for example) and to implement regulations on working conditions including 
equal treatment or health and safety standards.    
Beyond direct compensation workers may receive other benefits – such as paid 
vacations, paid public holidays, health insurance, paid sick days, pensions and other 
forms of compensation. In the United States many of these benefits are paid for 
privately and are entirely at the discretion of employers, though workers there are 
eligible, for example, for Social Security pension benefits, as a result of their pay-
roll-tax contributions.  
All European welfare states require firms to continue to pay their employees 
when they are sick.   The cost of sick pay is often shared between firms and the 
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state. In addition, in all European countries employment is directly linked with 
mandatory health, old age, unemployment and accident insurance, for which both 
employees and employers make contributions. In some EU countries, some welfare 
entitlements are financed by the state (mainly in Denmark) and in some cases, such 
as the National Health Service in the UK, entitlements are linked with citizenship 
(or residence) status and not employment.  These rights are mandatory and cannot 
be denied to the low paid, which means that alongside the minimum hourly wage, 
there is also a minimum social wage, which is often sizable.  
In the US a considerable proportion of average labor costs (about 37% in 2000) 
are non-wage costs (EBRI.org 2006), with the latter substantially lower for low-
wage workers, who generally have lower levels of non-wage benefits such as health 
care and paid time off. This overall US share is not far below the 43.3% non-wage 
costs in Germany or the about 45% rate for France but many social benefits (holi-
day and sick pay for instance) are not legally regulated. This allows employers to 
pay low-wage workers social wages below the average. The National Compensation 
Survey, for example, shows that low-paid and part-time workers are frequently 
excluded from non-wage benefits. Only 76% of employees in the US receive paid 
holidays and only 57% receive sick pay. Among employees earning less than $15 
per hour, these percentages are even lower, at 67% and 46% respectively.  The 
figures for part-timers are 37% and 22% (US Department of Labor, 2006).  
Thus for the low-paid the differences in social wages between the US, on the one 
hand, and the five European countries, on the other, are significantly larger than the 
differences for private wages alone. If the low wage threshold used here (i.e. two-
thirds of the national median hourly wage) had been computed on the basis of social 
rather than private wages, the proportion of low wage workers would almost cer-
tainly be even higher than 25% in the US, and the gap with the European countries 
would be wider. 
If, as in Europe, the government sets a minimum social wage, all firms are gen-
erally obligated to pay it.  By contrast, many US employers, operating in highly 
competitive and price sensitive markets, see little possibility of paying non-wage 
benefits above the minimum wage since their competitors are not likely to follow 
suit. 
 
 
6. No simple trade-offe between employment and wage inequality 
 
It has been often argued that in face of skill-biased demand shifts there is an in-
escapable trade-off between employment and wages for low-skilled workers. Less 
inequality in Europe would therefore be linked with lower employment, and higher 
inequality in the US with higher employment. From the small sample of countries 
analyzed here one cannot draw definite conclusions about possible trade-offs in 
other countries. Given this limitation, however, the data on levels and development 
of employment rates does not support this theory. Contrary to conventional wisdom 
in Denmark and the Netherlands, countries with strong welfare states and high 
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levels of collective bargaining, employment rates are higher than in the liberal 
economies of US and in UK, where wage inequality is much higher (See OECD, 
2009, Appendix, Table C).  
As discussed above (see section 3.2.) one would expect that high minimum 
wages would price at least the low skilled out of the market. The employment rate 
of persons (25-64 years)  with less than upper secondary education are, however,  
highest in Denmark (63%)  and the Netherlands and in France at the same level as 
in the US  (58%). UK has the highest employment rate of the low skilled (66%) in 
spite of the introduction of a minimum wage while the decrease of wages below the 
level of the Bristish minimum wage did not improve employment prospects of the 
low skilled in Germany who have the lowest employment rate of the six countries 
with 54% (OECD 2008b: Table D). This confirms the results of a recent analysis of 
the OECD which found that income inequality is negatively correlated with labour 
force participation and employment rates (OECD 2006: 165).  
These findings based on univariate analysis alone hint that institutional settings 
in some European countries help escaping the trade-of between employment and 
pay. They also do not preclude that in other settings (for example in France) such a 
trade-off may exist.  It seems plausible that employment rate outcomes depend 
heavily on the mix of particular institutions and policies.  
As mentioned above, a trade off between wages and employment could be 
avoided by increasing the productivity of workers by improvements in work 
organization, and investments in skills and technology. In some of the five 
industries under research some support for such high road strategies in countries 
with lower shares of low wage work were found. Front-line jobs in meat processing 
are more capital-intensive in Denmark and France where higher wages than in the 
four other countries were paid in this industry (Grunert et. al 2009). In German 
retail trade most sales persons are skilled and take over jobs which usually are done 
by supervisors in others countries (Carré et al 2009). Another example are hospitals. 
Low skilled and poorly paid jobs of “nursing assistants” in the US are transformed 
into better paid jos in all European countries (Mehaut et al 2009). In Denmark, 
France and Germany the jobs of call center agents are less fragmented and broader 
than in the other three countries although this does not always translate into higher 
pay in Germany. At the other extreme, in spite of high differences in wages work 
organization and job content was quite similar for hotel cleaners across all six 
countries without (Vanselow et.al 2009). This may illustrate the existence of the 
range of indeterminacy” (Lester 1964) in which wages can be set without negative 
employment impacts (see also above, the discussion in section 3.2).  
 
 
7. Conclusions: Inclusive versus exclusive pay-setting institutions 
   
In the two liberal market economies in Hall and Soskice's formulation (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001), the United Kingdom and the United States, the pay-setting regime 
is less "inclusive". Collective bargaining power is weak and does not extend much 
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beyond union members. The national minimum wage is low relative to the average 
wage. It compresses wages in the low wage sector but does not reduce the incidence 
of low pay. As a result, workers do well or badly primarily depending on their 
individual bargaining power, which almost by definition is slight for those occupy-
ing the lower reaches of the labor market  A critical difference between the United 
Kingdom and the United States is with respect to the impact of the state on the 
“social wage”. Low paid workers in the UK can count on better benefits and work-
ing conditions than those available to their low-wage counterparts in the US – paid 
holidays, paid sick days, paid parental leave and health care, for example.  Indeed, 
the lack of a "social wage" -more than any other factor-- separates the American 
low paid from their counterparts in all of the other countries in this study. Further-
more, EU directives on equal pay have improved the position of fixed term and 
part-time workers in the European Union and may do the same eventually for 
temporary agency workers.  
In Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, “coordinated market 
economies”, the role of institutions in determining wages is stronger.29  However, 
the institutions and their interactions still differ substantially between these coun-
tries.  All four countries have collective bargaining systems that are more inclusive 
than in the US or UK.  A significantly larger percentage of workers are covered by 
collective bargaining agreements, this coverage being achieved in a variety of ways.  
In Denmark, high coverage simply reflects high union density.  In France and the 
Netherlands coverage is extended because of the importance of employers’ organi-
zations and the legal extension of collective agreements. A statutory national mini-
mum wage also plays an important role – especially in France, where without the 
SMIC collective bargaining institutions , would not have been be sufficient to 
contain the incidence of low-paid work. In the Netherlands and France, the role of 
the state in the regulation of the low end of the labor market is more central than in 
Denmark.  Germany, one of the prototypes of coordinated economies, still has high 
union coverage. In recent years, coverage has declined as industry wide agreements 
have diminished in significance and employer density has declined.  Unless the 
state intervenes to plug gaps in coverage and inclusiveness, the incidence of low 
pay is likely to increase and indeed this is what has happened in Germany 
Product market, employment protection and social security policies can shore up 
collective as well as individual bargaining power, but the case studies and the 
_____________ 
 
29 In Hall and Soskice (2001) typology, if the USA and the United-Kingdom have usu-
ally been put forward as the reference models for liberal market economies, Germany, 
Sweden and Japan serve as the reference models for coordinated market economies. Accord-
ing to Hall and Soskice, France does not fit well as a coordinated market economy. Given 
the striking diversity amongst the group of countries serving as prototypes for the latter, 
some authors prefer to distinguish “corporatist” (Germany, Sweden) from “state-led” 
(France) varieties (Bosch Lehndorff and Rubery 2009).  
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national-level evidence show that these same features of labor markets and social 
policy can also reduce inclusiveness and increase labor-market dualism if some 
categories of employee are not covered.  Germany provides a striking example of 
this in its treatment of some of its non-standard workers. These non-standard work 
arrangements, together with outsourcing of jobs to companies not covered by col-
lective agreements, offer many “exit options” for employers30.  
The fairly stable incidence of low pay in Denmark and France can be explained 
by the stability of their industrial relations architectures and underlying political 
coalitions. These two countries managed to keep the share of low-wage workers 
stable despite structural change and an increase in the number of more vulnerable 
service jobs.  The increase of low pay in the Netherlands was mainly negotiated 
within an institutional setting that was also fairly stable.31 Collective bargaining in 
the United-States, the United-Kingdom and Germany are in transformation. Falling 
union density in United-States and the United-Kingdom has led to further “exhaus-
tion” of the already weak collective bargaining system. Although coverage of 
collective bargaining is still much higher than in the United-States or United-
Kingdom, Germany is losing ground because of the decline of industry-wide 
agreements and because of the creation of new “exit options” for employers; the 
country appears to be drifting towards the liberal model. Because of the absence of 
increases in the federal minimum wage in recent years, the United-States also 
provides an example of the deliberate neglect of institutional maintenance 
(Streek/Thelen 2005). In sharp contrast, the introduction of the National Minimum 
Wage in the United Kingdom and its gradual increase provide an example of the 
successful revitalization of instruments for low pay protection which had been 
removed by the Thatcher government.  
In the case of Germany, some “exit options” already existed before the rise in 
low-wage work in the 1990s, but they were used relatively infrequently. Within a 
given set of institutions, there always exists a margin of discretion that can be used 
for good or ill.  Especially at the bottom of the labor market, a strong employee 
voice is necessary at the establishment level for the enforcement of collective 
agreements, minimum wages and other employment protection regulation. Even 
where two countries have apparently equally strong wage setting systems at the 
aggregate level, enforcement might differ substantially. Virtuous circles between 
institutions inside and outside the firm might mutually support each other and lead 
firms to follow “high road” product and HRM strategies based on higher pay.  
_____________ 
 
30Referring to Gallie’s (2007) typology of “employment regimes”, Germany  is a good 
illustration of a “dualist regime”, as opposed to both “inclusive” (e.g. Denmark) and “mar-
ket” (e.g. United-States) regimes.  
31Using the Streeck and Thelen (2005) typology of change, this can be categorized as 
“conversion” of a tool to guarantee a wage floor at least partially into a tool for wage mod-
eration (see also Salverda, Van Klaveren and Van der Meer, 2008). 
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Such virtuous circles function only on the basis of a common understanding of 
their mission. Thus, for example, equity norms shared by all the actors may emerge, 
which can be used to settle distributional issues. Social norms may be also particu-
larly important in deterring opportunistic behaviour by employers, and may limit 
employers' use of “exit options.” As such, in some circumstances, they may also 
constitute an important dimension of institutional “inclusiveness” at a national or 
industry level32. 
Such mutually shared norms or beliefs of the main actors give specific institu-
tional settings their stability. They have to be reaffirmed regularly to be kept alive 
and transmitted to new generations of actors. Pay setting institutions not only em-
body social values but are reflective of historical compromises between different 
actors which might be subject to change. “Institutions frequently outlive their 
founding coalitions, and their endurance and robustness often involves a reconfigu-
ration of their coalitional base in light of shifting social, political and market condi-
tions” (Thelen 2004: 33) . The result might be changes of institutions but also 
different strategies within and outcomes from the same institutional setting. 
Changes in behaviors within a given set of institutions may be in some cases as 
important as changes in institutions themselves33. 
Minimum wages, and even more so minimum wage policies that reflect social 
and political commitments to equality and solidarity, have played contrasting roles 
among the countries in our study.   
The potential negative impact of the relative high minimum wages or high col-
lectively agreed minimum rates in Europe – especially in Denmark -- compared to 
the US seem to have been successfully counteracted by linkages with institutions 
providing high levels of productivity such as more intensive training for the less 
skilled. The impact of such institutional linkages needs to be further studied in order 
to avoid simplistic conclusions about the effect of minimum wages. Our country 
studies suggest the absence of obvious causal relationships between wages and 
_____________ 
 
32 In the Danish call center industry, for example (see. Lloyd at al., 2009), something ap-
proaching a “high road” human resource strategy emerged despite the lack of formal agree-
ments and regulations. In this case, the employer response does not seem to flow primarily 
from a culture of “social consensus” (as is often argued for the Scandinavian countries), but 
more from fear of retaliation from unions (even though union density is relatively low in this 
sector) and from concerns about being stigmatized in the eyes of both workers and consum-
ers. Explicit “name and shame” campaigns such as those in the US hotel and retail industries 
also illustrate the use of social norms that low-wage workers can use to defend their interests. 
33Germany offers a striking example. The large changes in the regulation of the German 
labor market are quite recent: the so-called “Hartz laws” (which included the deregulation of 
temp agency work, decreases in the generosity of unemployment benefit and other changes) 
have only been adopted since 2004. During the 1990s and 2000s, however, changes in 
employer behavior within a relatively stable institutional environment played at least as big 
a role as the formal reforms that followed. 
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employment at national level, whilst the link between the two variables seems to 
differ from country to country because of the diverging institutional architecture. 
 
Whatever mix of institutions determines the extent of inclusiveness in any indi-
vidual country, collective bargaining at a level above that of the company or or-
ganization is a common feature of inclusive systems.  In achieving inclusiveness, 
the government cannot replace the social partners, but it must play a role if the 
incidence of low pay is to be small, a decent social wage is to be paid, and the 
consequences of low pay for the current living standards and prospects of its recipi-
ents are to be mitigated.  
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